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KIERKEGAARD ON RATIONALITY
Marilyn Gaye Piety

This paper is concerned with Kierkegaard's views on the nature of human
rationality in the specific context of the relation between competing interpretations of existence. Contemporary dialogue has reached the point where it
appears movement between such interpretations can only be understood as
rational, if it is seen as a natural or evolutionary development and not as the
result of a choice. This paper provides a sketch of a theory of rationality
which enables us to make sense of the impression that we do, at least occasionally, choose between competing interpretations of existence and that we
make such choices for what we believe are good, or even compelling reasons.

The idea has been advanced that human behavior, or more specifically,
choice, can only be understood as rational within a particular conceptual
framework. Proponents of this view contend that any possible system of
justification must be understood as relative to a particular framework or
system of values and hence that it is not possible to make rational choices
between frameworks. Charles Taylor argues, on the other hand, that movement between frameworks can be rational. He bases this argument, however,
on the claim that such movement is a natural or evolutionary development
and not the result of a choice. I The contemporary debate on this issue has
reached the point where it appears we must consider either that it is not
possible to choose rationally between frameworks, or that there is rational
movement between frameworks, but that this movement is not the result of
a choice.
Taylor contends that the transition from one framework to another is effected through what he refers to as "error reducing moves."2 That is, he asserts
that insofar as a given framework may involve certain incoherences, and
insofar as an individual may be motivated to reduce these incoherences, his
effort to do this may actually eventuate in the production of, or transition to,
a new framework. He asserts that the situation of Luther with respect to
traditional catholicism could be understood as exemplifying a movement of
this sort.
Taylor argues, however, that such a transition from one framework to another is not the result of an appeal to some criterion that is independent of
the two frameworks in question, but rather that it is the natural result of the
desire of the individual for a more coherent scheme for interpreting his
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existence. Taylor does not see the individual as choosing between competing
systems of interpretation, but rather as developing new systems through an
effort to reduce the incoherences or errors inherent in the old systems.
Thus, while many theorists are disposed to see the movement from one
framework to another as fundamentally irrational, Taylor sees it as rational.
Taylor is in agreement with the former group, however, in that he is not
willing to allow that there are any criteria independent of the two frameworks
in question, such that an appeal to these criteria would justify, or show to be
rational, the choice of one over another.
It would appear that the impasse at which the contemporary debate on the
nature of human rationality has arrived is the result of the tendency of philosophers, despite their efforts to the contrary, to cling to the old Enlightenment view
of disinterested and dispassionate reasoning as the paradigm of that rationality.
I shall argue that Kierkegaard provides us with a picture of an interested and
impassioned reason which enables us to see how it is possible for the transition
from one framework to another to be both rational and the result of a choice and
that insofar as it does this, it represents a more "reasonable" picture of reason
than the one that has been traditionally offered by metaphysics.

I
The view that choice can only be understood as rational relative to a particular
conceptual framework is precisely the one that provides the foundation for
Alasdair MacIntyre's charge in After Virtue) that Kierkegaard considers moral
commitment to be "the expression of a criterionless choice,"4 or a choice
between "incompatible and incommensurable moral premises, a choice for
which no rational justification can be given." MacIntyre refers to this position
as Kierkegaard's "discovery" and identifies it as his primary contribution to
the history of moral or ethical philosophy; a contribution which MacIntyre
claims marks the beginning of the "distinctively modern standpoint" on the
nature of moral debate. MacIntyre is undoubtedly correct in his identification
of the distinctively modern standpoint on such debates. He is not correct,
however, as will become clear in the pages which follow, in his ascription of
this view to Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard's frameworks may be designated 'aesthetic,' 'ethical,' 'religious' and 'paradoxically religious' or 'Christian.'5 That is, Kierkegaard's individual views existence from within one or the other of these alternative
schemes of interpretation. The aesthetic individual, for example, views existence as defined aesthetically. He interprets the value of the phenomena of
his existence-including his own actions-as derivative of, or reducible to,
their aesthetic significance. Thus an aesthete values actions not insofar as
they exemplify morally uplifting principles, but rather insofar as they are
immediately compelling, interesting, or sensuously gratifying.
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The difficulty, as Macintyre so forcefully pointed out, is that different
frameworks represent significantly different systems of values, hence what
may serve as a criterion for choice within an ethical framework will very
likely not enjoy the same status within an aesthetic framework. 6 The moral
superiority of an ethical over an aesthetic interpretation of existence cannot
serve, for an aesthete, as a criterion for choosing it over his present interpretation, because such "superiority" is not considered by an aesthete to be of
any positive value. This situation is, of course, mirrored by that of the ethicist;
hence one might conclude from this, as indeed Macintyre does conclude, that
such a choice between frameworks as Kierkegaard has B recommending to
A in Either-Or, cannot be a rational one.
Macintyre focuses upon the transition from an aesthetic to an ethical view
of existence. It is clear, however, from Kierkegaard's own description of this
transition, that Macintyre has not properly understood Kierkegaard's position. The aesthetic stage of existence is also referred to by Kierkegaard as
the stage of immediacy. To be an aesthete, for Kierkegaard, means to have
an understanding of existence which interprets it in terms of what appears,
in an immediate sense, to be true about it. Such an individual has his consciousness, according to Kierkegaard-and in particular his consciousness of
suffering-in the dialectic of fortune and misfortune. 7 Thus Kierkegaard argues that misfortune or suffering is, for this individual,
like a narrow pass on the way; now the immediate individual is in it, but his
view of life must essentially always tell him that the difficulty will soon cease
to hinder because it is a foreign element. If it does not cease, he despairs, by
which his immediacy ceases to function, and the transition to another understanding of existence is rendered possible. 8

What happens to the aesthete is that, in his despair, it seems to him as if
there is a discrepancy between his suffering-insofar as it is persistent-and
the interpretation of existence in which suffering is viewed as having merely
accidental significance. Thus the aesthete, using the persistence of his suffering as a criterion for choosing between a view of existence in which suffering
is considered merely accidental and a view in which it is seen as essential,
may reject the aesthetic interpretation in favor of an ethical one. Such an
individual adopts an ethical framework, not because it promises to alleviate
his suffering, but because it provides an interpretation of his existence which
sees suffering as something essential to that existence, and thus provides a
more adequate-or one might even say more rational-account of his subjective experience.
It may be that there are other criteria, or other aspects of subjective experience apart from suffering, that could serve as criteria for choosing between
competing interpretations of existence on Kierkegaard's view. Suffering is,
however, the criterion which Kierkegaard himself chooses to focus upon
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when examining the nature of the transition from one stage of existence to
another in the Postscript9 and it will become apparent, in the pages which
follow, that this criterion alone is enough to expose the erroneous nature of
MacIntyre's interpretation of Kierkegaard and his subsequent charge that
Kierkegaard was an irrationalist.

II
Insofar as one framework or interpretation of existence may be spoken of as
more adequate than another-that is, insofar as it may be spoken of as providing a more satisfactory account of the nature of the subjective experience
of a particular individual-it is entirely reasonable to consider that it is more
rational. 1o What is likely less clear, however, is precisely how the individual
comes to consider that one interpretation is more adequate than another. In
this instance we are concerned specifically with how it is that the individual
comes to consider that the persistence of suffering is too great for the aesthetic
interpretation of existence to be plausible, for it appears that it would be
entirely possible for an individual to persist in suffering while simultaneously
persisting in the belief that the suffering was indeed accidental and that in
the next moment, with a change of fortune, it would stop.
Objectively, there is no incoherence in the idea that an aesthetic individual
may experience persistent suffering. The accidental may indeed be persistent.
The aesthetic interpretation of existence is not contradicted by the occurrence
of what is, within this framework, the improbable persistence of suffering.
Such statements of probability or improbability as a given framework expresses
cannot be strictly contradicted by any event [e.g., the persistence of suffering]
however improbably this event may appear in its light. The contradiction
must be established by a personal [my italics] act of appraisal. ll
The question is: Whence arises this "personal act of appraisal"; or when and
how does the individual come to consider the persistence of his suffering to
be too great and hence too improbable, within the aesthetic framework, for
that interpretation of existence to be correct?
It is at this point that Kierkegaard's views concerning the role of passion
in human reason come into play. It is widely recognized by Kierkegaard
scholars that, as Heinrich Schmidinger expresses it: "Subjektives Engagement
ist ... immer mit Leidenschaft und Pathos verbunden."12 It has also been observed, however, that Kierkegaard considers passion to be opposed to reflection,13 hence it is often believed that subjective engagement, according to
Kierkegaard, is purely emotional, or devoid of any intellectual component.
This view is the result of a failure to appreciate that the intellectual dimension of human experience is not reducible, for Kierkegaard, to reflection.
Reflection is indeed dispassionate or disinterested, according to Kierkegaard. 14
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He also speaks of "abstract" or "systematic" thought as disinterested. IS This
would appear, however, to be a rather abbreviated or short hand way of
emphasizing that the object of such thought is not the self, for he states
elsewhere that all knowledge "is interested,"'6 whether the object of interest
is something outside the knower, as is the case in metaphysics, or whether it
is the knower himself, as is the case in ethics and religion.
Kierkegaard often equates passion and interest. 17 It is thus reasonable to
assume that, if knowledge is interested, then it is also passionate, or involves
passion at some level. But if knowledge involves passion, then it would
appear that passion is not essentially opposed to reason, but rather plays an
important part in the activity of the knower as such. If this is the case, then
the passionate nature of subjective engagement does not preclude the possibility that such engagement could be rational. Hence the "personal act of
appraisal" in question is not a merely arbitrary, capricious or emotional reaction to a phenomenon or particular set of phenomena; it is the result of a
rational assessment of this phenomenon, or these phenomena, where the
reason in question is of a passionate or interested sort.
The difficulty is that very few scholars appreciate the way in which passion
informs reason, on Kierkegaard's view. In order to throw some light on this
issue I shall depart for a moment from the examination of Kierkegaard's texts
and turn instead to the consideration of the views of a more contemporary
philosopher on this same issue. Michael Polanyi, whose views on probability
I quoted above, is concerned in his book Personal Knowledge with how it is
that apparently objectively meaningless probability statements become subjectively meaningful guides for interpreting reality.'8 Polanyi maintains that
there is an area of extremely low probability-i.e., what we would refer to
in everyday speech as an area of high improbability-that we find generally
unacceptable. The occurrence of an event that is associated with this level of
improbability leads us, he argues, to reject the interpretation of existence
within which this event is considered so improbable and to search for a new
interpretation where events such as the one in question are considered more
probable. Polanyi goes on to point out, however, that any attempt toformalize
the precise degree of improbability that we find unacceptable and which,
when connected to a particular phenomenon within a given theory or interpretation of existence, would lead us to reject that view as false "is likely to
go too far unless it acknowledges in advance that it [i.e., the formalization]
must remain within a framework of personal [i.e., impassioned subjective]
judgement."'9
The metaphysical tradition has led us to believe that such impassioned
SUbjective judgement is vastly inferior-if indeed it has any claim to legitimacy at all-to dispassionate objective judgement. In a situation such as the
one described above, however, a purely dispassionate or objective perspective
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would lead to no judgement at all, but rather to a sort of skeptical epoche.
That is, viewed purely objectively, the occurrence of a highly improbable
event says nothing about the truth or falsity of the framework within which
it is viewed as improbable; it neither supports it, nor discredits it, so it fails
to provide us with a foundation-i.e., an objective foundation-for any judgement whatsoever concerning the status of the framework.
It is clear, though, that not only do we often make such judgements, we
appear to be compelled to make them simply by virtue of the kind of creatures
we are. The difficulty is that there appear to be no fixed guidelines in relation
to these judgements. But to say that there are no fixed guidelines is not to
say that there are no guidelines at all. Passion, which has traditionally been
considered to be in essential opposition to reason, permeates our understanding-or attempts to understand-our situation at such points and it is
this passion, according to Kierkegaard, which serves as a guide to the judgements we make in these situations.

III
The metaphysical tradition has been reluctant to appreciate the way in which
passion informs our understanding of ourselves and the phenomena of our
experience, hence it is to Polanyi, a chemist turned philosopher-i.e., a metaphysical interloper-that we must turn for the explicitly formulated observation that some of the most meaningful of our assertions in science are only
possible as the result of a collaboration of reason and passion and that these
assertions will thus always and necessarily "have a passionate quality attached to them."20
Passion is admittedly not an easy concept to elucidate. Some effort at
elucidation is necessary, however, because it is precisely passion that, according to Kierkegaard, informs the understanding of an individual in such a way
that extra-framework criteria, or reasons for choosing between competing
interpretations of existence, may come to exist for him.
A positive account of the meaning of 'passion' is difficult, if not impossible,
to provide. An impression of this meaning may be provided, however, if the
expression is understood to be contrasted with such expressions as 'dispassion' or 'disinterestedness.' Polanyi claims that passion is to be found in our
"personal participation"21 with the phenomenon whose probability is in question. Such participation might be understood to exemplify an essentially
interested, as opposed to disinterested, relation to this phenomenon. It is just
such an interested stance which Kierkegaard believes is appropriate with
respect to the subjective phenomenon of suffering. 22 That is, Kierkegaard
maintains that we have an essential interest in determining or choosing the
proper interpretation of existence. Our eternal blessedness, or eternal damnation is, according to Kierkegaard, ultimately dependent upon this choice.
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But if we do not take such an interested stance in relation to the phenomena
of our subjective experience, then it will never be possible for us to choose
between various interpretations of existence 23-and, in particular, to choose
the correct one-for the criteria for such choices can only exist for the
interested observer. It is for this reason that Kierkegaard argues in the Postscript that Christianity has "nothing whatever to do with the systematic zeal
of the personally indifferent [my italics] individual," but assumes rather "an
infinite personal passionate interest [my italics)" on the part of the individual
as "conditio sine qua non."24
Thus it becomes clear that the discernment of a discrepancy between the
aesthetic interpretation of existence, which sees suffering as accidental, and
the persistence of the suffering which the individual experiences, is the result
of an impassioned or subjective judgement on the part of that individual. The
greater the degree of passion with which the consciousness of the individual
is informed, the less high the degree of the improbability of the suffering
need be, in order for the individual to seize upon that improbability as
grounds for rejecting the interpretation of existence within which the particular account of suffering is contained. 25
Picture the aesthete who experiences persistent suffering, but does not
despair-i.e., he does not judge that his subjective experience discredits the
interpretation of existence which views it as improbable. What distinguishes
such an individual from one who does despair? It would appear that the
individual who does not despair, fails to do so because he considers the
phenomena of his existence-or of his subjective experience-objectively, which
is to say, dispassionately; while the individual who does despair, does so precisely
because he considers these same phenomena subjectively or passionately.
It is one thing, however, to observe that a choice between competing interpretations of existence is only possible if one takes a passionate or interested
stance relative to the phenomena of one's subjective experience, and another
to argue that such a stance justifies rather than merely explains this choice.
Passion, for Kierkegaard, is the very essence of human existence. It is well
known that Kierkegaard proposes that subjectivity is truth,26 but it is not so
well known that he also proposes that subjectivity is passionY To be dispassionate, or insufficiently passionate, for Kierkegaard, is to be indifferent to
existence, and this, in turn, amounts to being insufficiently human. It is for
this reason that Kierkegaard considers the choice of an ethical over an aesthetic interpretation of existence to be justified, rather than merely explicable.
That is, a passionate perspective relative to the phenomena of one's subjective
experience is the only sort of perspective that is in keeping, on Kierkegaard's
view, with the essence of the individual. A dispassionate perspective would
not cohere with that essence.
Thus passion emerges as the catalyst of the exchange of one perspective
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of existence for another. That is, passion breaks down the apparent coherence
or descriptive adequacy of a particular interpretation of existence. Unless the
consciousness of the individual is informed with a sufficient degree of passion, the persistence of his or her suffering cannot serve as a criterion for
rejecting the aesthetic in favor of the ethical interpretation of existence.
It is, of course, possible to be too passionate. If the consciousness of the
individual is informed with too much passion, the resultant interpretation of
existence may cross over into the pathological. Such a phenomenon is actually addressed by Kierkegaard and referred to by him in the Postscript as
subjective madness (subjektive Galskab).28 It is important to note, however,
that it is not possible to formalize the precise degree of passion which is
sufficient to break down the aesthetic interpretation of existence so that the
choice of another interpretation becomes possible, and yet not so great as to
qualify the individual as pathological. It is precisely this resistance of passion,
or of an understanding which is informed with passion, to such formalization
that serves as a stumbling block to metaphysics. But this is simply our situation as human beings and part of the task of philosophy is to help us to
achieve a more profound understanding of that situation.

IV
I have restricted my explication of the nature of the transition from one stage
of existence to another to the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical stage.
I have done this because this was the transition that MacIntyre examined and
which he used in an effort to support his charge that Kierkegaard was an
irrationalist. It should be clear now that Kierkegaard's own interpretation of
the nature of this transition will not support MacIntyre's charge. Opponents
of the view I am propounding might argue, however, that while it appears
possible to consider the choice between any of the non-Christian interpretations as rational, the same thing cannot be said concerning the choice to adopt
a Christian framework. It is tempting to interpret Kierkegaard such that it
appears the transition to the Christian stage of existence is the result of a
choice for which there can be no criterion.
We can see, however, from the quotation below, that there is a criterion for
choosing the Christian interpretation; this criterion is precisely the phenomenon of the consciousness of sin. That is, Kierkegaard contends that
Christianity is only related to the consciousness of sin. Any other attempt to
become a Christian for any other reason is quite literally lunacy; and that is
how it should be. 29

Just as the ethical interpretation of existence provided a more adequate
account of human suffering to the aesthete whose consciousness was informed with a sufficient degree of passion, so does the Christian interpretation provide a more adequate account of the subjective experience of the
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individual whose consciousness is informed with an even greater degree of
passion.
Such passion arises, again, from an interested stance toward the question
of which of the possible interpretations of existence is correct. The more
extreme the interpretation presented to the individual, the more passionateas opposed to dispassionate-must his or her self examination be. That is,
when an individual is presented with an interpretation of existence such as
that offered by Christianity, an interpretation which makes his or her eternal
blessedness or eternal damnation dependent upon its acceptance, then the
proper response is not a casual concern as to the truth of this interpretation,
but rather a deep and impassioned introspection in which the individual
repeatedly asks himself: "Could this be the real nature of my existence?"
"Does this interpretation of my existence make the most sense-i.e., more
sense than any other interpretation-of my subjective experience?"30

v
With this we have a simple model of Kierkegaard's theory concerning the
nature of human rationality. We must distinguish, however, what is essential
to Kierkegaard's position as he understood it, and what is essential for the
purposes of defending Kierkegaard against the charge of irrationalism as that
charge was leveled against him by MacIntyre. It is important to appreciate
that Kierkegaard's own understanding of the position described above involved a foundation of religious belief which is separable from the position
itself. Kierkegaard would no more consider the persistence of an individual
who has the good luck not to suffer in an aesthetic interpretation to be
justified than we would consider the racism of an ignorant person to be
justified. That is, just as we would consider that an ignorant person should
know better than to be racist, Kierkegaard would consider that a fortunate
person should know better than to persist in an aesthetic interpretation of
existence.
Existence, for Kierkegaard, is characterized by sin and part of the way in
which sin manifests itself is in the inability of the individual to sustain
emotional equilibrium in the face of misfortune or adversity. It is this inability
which accounts for the suffering in question. The difficulty is that this inability itself stems from an excessive attachment to worldly pleasure or comfort.J1
As long as the existence of an individual is characterized by such attachment,
suffering is still present in it, in potentia. Hence, while suffering justifies the
choice of an ethical over an aesthetic interpretation of existence, on
Kierkegaard's view, the absence of suffering does not have the same significance. The absence of suffering does not justify the endorsement of an aesthetic view of existence because suffering is always present in the existence
of an individual in potentia, so to speak, in the form of sin. Any individual
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who is sufficiently reflective to appreciate the tenuous nature of happiness
on the aesthetic interpretation, would find his or her existence, no matter how
"fortunate," characterized by an anxiety or fear of potential adversity which
would itself constitute a kind of suffering. The only way to avoid such anxiety, on Kierkegaard's view, would be to avoid reflection.
We may argue that different levels of reflection are natural for different
sorts of people and that it is even possible for certain individuals to live lives
almost entirely devoid of reflection. Kierkegaard's religious convictions compel him to assume, however, that the activity of reflection is universally
human and that whatever differences there may be in the degree of reflection
which characterize various individuals, even the least reflective individual
can only avoid recognizing the tenuous nature of happiness on the aesthetic
view of existence by willfully refusing to reflect upon the significance of this
view. And this willful refusal, on Kierkegaard's view, constitutes, in turn, a
flight from the acknowledgement of oneself as sinful.
It is not necessary, however, that one share Kierkegaard's religious views
in order to appreciate the force of his claim concerning the possibility of
extra-framework criteria for choosing between competing interpretations of
existence. If this were necessary, then the charge of irrationalism could still
be leveled against him. That is, the support for his position would ultimately
rest upon a foundation of dogma that could not itself be chosen for any reason,
for it would only be relative to this foundation that reasons for such choices
could exist.
One of the most important aspects of Kierkegaard's position is that experience is distinguished from the various interpretations which may be supplied to it. The medium of experience, according to Kierkegaard, is actuality,
while the medium of such interpretations is ideality. That is, the interpretations represent clusters of concepts (hence the origin of the appellation "conceptual framework") and the medium of concepts is abstract, in contrast to
the medium of experience, which is concrete. 32
We can keep the view that subjective experience, insofar as it is actual,
may be distinguished from a particular conceptual framework or ideal interpretation that is supplied to it and the claim that this experience can provide
criteria for choosing between such frameworks, without having to accept the
view that experience, properly defined, will always incline one toward a
particular interpretation of existence. This is what one might refer to as the
theoretical skeleton of Kierkegaard's view of rationality as it appears when
stripped of the religious assumptions which gave the view its more specific
definition in Kierkegaard's works.33
Taylor's contention that the transition from one interpretation of existence to
another is effected through a move of error reduction is consistent with much
of what Kierkegaard says concerning such transitions. On Kierkegaard's

KIERKEGAARD ON RATIONALITY

375

view, one rejects the aesthetic framework in favor of an ethical one precisely
because a passionate interpretation of the persistence of one's suffering leads
one to consider that there is an error in the aesthetic framework-the "error"
in question being the view that suffering is of merely accidental significance
or the result of misfortune. The difference between Taylor and Kierkegaard
is that on Kierkegaard's account, the errors are not inconsistencies within a
particular framework-for as we have seen, the persistence of suffering is
not, objectively, inconsistent with the interpretation of existence which views
such persistence as improbable-but are errors relative to the individual's
subjective or impassioned experience.
One could express Kierkegaard's views in secular terms by substituting for
"guilt consciousness" or "[t]he anguished conscience" what Taylor has identified as a "need for meaning."34 Taylor contends that individuals are faced
today with the problem of attempting to imbue their existence with some
significance that goes beyond the expression and fulfillment-or lack
thereof-of their daily needs.
Thus if one is more comfortable with the expression 'need for meaning'
than with Kierkegaard's overtly religious expression like 'guilt consciousness,' an individual could be understood as adopting a particular framework
because he perceived that that framework promised to imbue his existence
with the meaning of which he felt a lack. In this wayan ethical interpretation
of existence could be seen as supplying meaning to the suffering of an individual that the aesthetic interpretation was unable to supply.35

Concluding Comments
It should now be clear that the charge of irrationalism leveled against

Kierkegaard by MacIntyre is based upon a misunderstanding of the relation
between the aesthetic and the ethical interpretations of existence on
Kierkegaard's view. Not only is Kierkegaard's philosophy not irrationalist in
the way in which MacIntyre and others have claimed, his conception of the
nature of human rationality is one which can be of great help in relation to
the contemporary debate on the nature of human rationality. The view that
"rational" decisions need not always be the result of purely objective or
dispassionate speculation and that hence emotional or non-rational phenomena may serve as criteria for such choices is clearly one which would be of
use to contemporary theorists.
Kierkegaard's interpretation of human rationality provides us with a positive alternative to the traditional conception of reason as disinterested and
dispassionate. But it is not simply an alternative to this more traditional
conception. It is an alternative with an advantage. That is, it provides us with
a way to get beyond the impasse at which the contemporary debate on this
issue has arrived, by reminding us that there are some areas of inquiry where
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"an objective indifference can .. .learn nothing at all,"36 or as Nagel expressed
it in The View From Nowhere, where "the truth is not to be found by traveling
as far away from one's personal perspective as possible,"37 and hence where
being "rational" means taking a passionate or interested stance in relation to
the phenomena in question.
Kierkegaard's view of rationality possesses a further advantage over the
traditional view in that it provides us with a more descriptively adequate
account of our understanding of ourselves and of the phenomena of our
subjective experience. That is, it does not preclude the possibility that our
movement from one interpretation of existence to another may take place as
a natural or evolutionary development rather than as the result of a choice,
but it also allows us to make sense of the experience, that we at least occasionally have, that we choose to adopt a particular interpretation of existence,
that there are good reasons for adopting this interpretation and that we choose
to adopt it for those reasons and not simply as a matter of pure caprice.
What we have in Kierkegaard's picture of the role of passion in reason is
a more "reasonable" picture of reason than the one that has been offered to
us by the metaphysical tradition. It is a picture of reason that involves a
positive incorporation of what we essentially are, subjects situated in and
passionately engaged with the flux which constitutes our temporal existence.
Finally, it is a picture that allows us to justify rationally the weight that we
seem compelled, simply by virtue of the kind of creatures we are, to attribute
to our subjective experience.
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